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 Some Implications of Market-like Models of 
Organisation on Public Ethos 
 
A discussion based upon a case study of local government in 
Denmark and Norway 
 
Negative Images of market-like models of organisation within the frame-  
work of New Public Management (NPM)1  
This article focuses on implications of market-like models of 
organisation, which are inspired by ideas from NPM. Does buying 
services for the elderly influence the local democracy negatively as 
opposed to the local authorities’ own production of services? The market-
like models in question are the purchaser-provider model and competitive 
tendering. Units of analysis are two local authorities, one in Denmark and 
one in Norway.  
One criticism of NPM has centred upon the neglect of virtues highly 
valued in the traditional public sector, such as fairness, equity, justice and 
representation (Nolan, ed., 2001). Christensen and Lægreid, for instance 
are focusing upon the hindrances that these modern forms of organising 
public service lay on the role of politicians in the decision-making- 
process (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999). The same authors state 
elsewhere that NPM in the Norwegian context have moved the focus 
away from, among other things, the rule of law and political control, and 
that it has been more concentrated upon the delivery of service to people 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1997: 376). In a recent study on NPM-reforms 
on ministerial level in Norway, one of Christensen and Lægreid's major 
conclusions is that these reforms weaken political governability 
(2002:216). Another who criticises NPM, or more exactly the purchaser-
provider-model, asks: "...is municipal government being compelled to 
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1 The  concept NPM stands for New Public Management. I use the concept according to Greve (2001); as an 
abbreviation of marketisation and the use of methods of  organisation and leadership from the private sector of 
the economy.  
adopt a culture which is alien to its ideological and legal character?" 
(Riberdahl quoted in Batley and Stoker, 1991:217).  
Ormsby (1998) follows the same path in his discussion when he states 
that much criticism against the purchaser-provider-model in international 
literature point to the models' neglect of public ethics. Batley (ibid, 217) 
claim that the British reforms, during the Thatcher-period, were 
concerned with depoliticising the control of services and increasing the 
role of managers, users and the private sector. In studies of local 
government reforms in Scandinavia the message has often been that there 
is a conflict between NPM-ideas and a traditional view of councillors as 
representatives of the citizens, advocating peoples' interest, defining 
needs, setting priorities and controlling implementation (Kleven et al. 
2000).  
Councillors themselves, according to these studies, repeatedly state 
that they feel they have lost control over policy implementation in the 
local authority. They also often feel that policy formulation and 
evaluation to a large extent are in the hands of the professional 
administration.  
To be fair, there are also voices heard in this debate that are not 
predominantly negative about politicians' possibilities to influence 
decision making. Fimreite and Stenvoll (1999:161) for instance, argue 
that competitive tendering can strengthen local democracy by returning to 
politicians the control of standards. Hagen (1997) and Jacobsen 
(1997:207) argue along the same lines. However, these scholars build first 
of all upon theoretical considerations, not on empirical data.  
I shall contribute to the discussion by focusing on local authorities, 
with data from a study I conducted some years ago in two Scandinavian 
local authorities (Tufte 2000).  
What I will do, is to question whether the negative images of NPM 
which I have referred to, comply with empirical data at local government 
level. I have two objectives with this article. First, I want to shed light 
upon what is happening with politicians' possibilities of exerting 
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influence under these new principles of organisation. Do the NPM 
principles imply less political influence over services, which are offered 
by local authorities (as many scholars claim)? Second, I want to explore 
whether or not these principles of organisation imply inattention to public 
ethics. The underlying assumption of my interpretations is that 
organisational structure has a great impact on the way politicians can 
develop public services.  
My discussion uses a theoretical framework that builds upon what is 
commonly known as core-virtues connected to the public sector. These 
virtues will mainly be defined according to the content given to the 
concept "public ethos" by Lundquist (1997), with an addition of some 
virtues, which are supposed to be fundamental to the Nordic welfare-state 
model.  
The principles of organisation that I have in mind are competitive 
tendering combined with a purchaser-provider-model in the field of 
welfare for elderly people on local government level. Both local 
authorities I studied had engaged private for-profit firms to handle major 
parts of the care of elderly people. The Danish local authority I studied 
used a firm as agent for their home service for elderly persons, while the 
Norwegian local authority used a firm to run one of their nursery homes.  
I shall start with a brief presentation of the public-ethos-concept as it is 
applied here.  
The public ethos  
In this article I draw mainly on the concept "the public ethos" as it is 
conceptualised by Lennart Lundquist in his book published in 1997. 
Though the concept was developed with reference to the public sector in 
Sweden, the concept applies as well to, for instance, the American or the 
Australian version as the difference is more a matter of language than of 
content. For my part I claim that the concept, that I outline here, express 
common and shared virtues for the public sector in all western liberal 
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democracies. In addition, I shall incorporate some values or virtues, as I 
prefer to call them here, which are commonly seen as basic parts of the 
Nordic welfare-state model.  
While Lundquist is focusing on bureaucrats’ role as guardians of the 
public ethos, my focus is on local politicians’ role as caretakers of the 
same ethos. 
Lundquist divides the concept public ethos in to two parts; virtues 
connected to democracy on the one side, and economic virtues on the 
other side. The democratic virtues are about political democracy, the rule 
of law and public ethics. He points out that these virtues overlap with 
each other. Economic virtues are about rationality, efficiency and 
productivity. While the economic virtues are potentially relevant to many 
sectors of society, the democratic virtues are valid solely for the public 
sector.  
My analysis will first and foremost be connected with the democratic 
virtues because these are the ones that distinguish the public sector from 
the rest of society.  
I have elaborated Lundquist's concept of democracy somewhat, but I 
follow the central elements in his definition. The following three elements 
are all essentially linked to the concept of democracy:  
1) "Political democracy" means that:  
- the local authorities are headed by representatives of the local 
constituency, who are  
- elected by open, periodic and free elections,  
-    the representatives have possibilities to influence on vital issues under 
the jurisdiction of the local authorities, and  
- the right to vote on local elections are granted to most of the adult 
population in the local authorities.  
In my discussion later I shall focus on the politicians’ potentials to 
exert vital influence on the service delivery for elderly persons. This is in 
accordance with one of my main questions mentioned in the first part of 
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this article: What is happening with politicians' possibilities of exerting 
influence under specific NPM-like principles of organisation?  
The next two elements that I link to the concept of democracy serve as 
a point of departure to my discussion regarding to what extent NPM-like 
principles of organisation imply a threat to public ethos virtues like "the 
rule of law" and "public ethics"? This is the second question that I ask in 
this article.  
2) "The rule of law" means among other things:  
- public services offered by the local authority are distributed to the civic 
according to openly known rules,  
-    equal cases are to be dealt with equally,  
- the individual citizen has the right to see the documents interfering the 
matters in which he is involved,  
- the individual citizen has the right to appeal against decisions in 
individual cases, and  
- the public (e.g. the media) has access to most of the documents in the 
archives of the local authority.  
3) "Public ethics" means that:  
- the local authority treats all citizens in the same way,  
- justly, impartially and  
- the employees are not allowed to take bribes.  
- the public services are for everybody, independent of income and place 
of living (the principle of universality).  
I would like to stress that it is virtues and not realities that I am 
speaking of. This is important to have in mind because local authorities 
often fail to meet the standards set by these virtues.  
Before I give the reader a representative selection of data from my two 
case studies, a few words about the purchaser-provider model will be 
presented.  
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What is the difference between a purchaser-provider way of 
organising public services in contrast to a traditional way of 
organising these services?  
What is the difference between a purchaser-provider model and a 
traditional model of organising public services? The main difference lies 
in the name of the former model itself; it means a division between the 
function of purchasing a specific service and the function of delivering 
this service. In a traditional model the same agent broadly speaking, 
handles these functions, whereas in the former the roles of purchaser and 
provider are separated. An illustration can perhaps render a clearer 
impression of what this means:  
Traditional model    Purchaser-provider model  
       
       Bying  Selling 
 
 
The local authority and its 
employees take care of all 
functions 
The local authority orga-
nises a specific office 
which purchases service 
from…
…one or more 
delivery agents 
Fig. 1 A traditional model versus a purchaser-provider model1  
Take the example a service for elderly people in a municipality, which 
is in focus in my own study. Traditionally, at least in the Nordic 
countries, all necessary equipment as well as nurses, clerks etc are in the 
hands of the municipality, whereas the service delivery and all it implies 
are taken care of by an agent of its own in the other model. This agent can 
be a private firm or an autonomous municipal unit. Often this model is 
combined with competitive tendering, which means that private firms and 
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1 Other models also exist. For my purpose I choose to compare only two models. 
autonomous local authorities compete over the terms of service delivery. 
This was the situation in the two local authorities, which I have studied.  
What did they do?  
I shall give a characterisation of the rules the two local authorities 
developed in order to allocate their service for elderly people. These rules 
are supposed to be essential implications of the organisational reforms 
that are presented above.  
First, one has to have in mind a few basic facts about the local 
authorities involved in the study. A liberal-conservative majority in the 
city council headed both local authorities by the time I studied them. The 
decision to implement a purchaser provider model in combination with 
competitive tendering was made under firm opposition by the left-wing 
minority parties in the city councils of both local authorities. The two 
local authorities have approximately the same numbers of inhabitants, 
more precisely between 20 000 and 26 000 inhabitants. They are both 
situated at about one hours' drive from their national capitals 
(Copenhagen/Oslo). The professional composition of their citizens differs 
very much. While the Danish commune is more like a village in a rural 
area, where tourism plays a vital part, the Norwegian commune is an old 
industrial town.  
As one can see from this description, these two cases have a lot of 
similarities. In addition to these similarities I have taken for granted that 
the legal boundaries connected to the municipal level on the field of care 
for elderly people are quite the same in the two countries. These common 
features taken together makes it unlikely that other differences have had a 
major influence on the design of the organisation structure, not to say 
how it works.  
First of all it is interesting to experience how the two local authorities 
have chosen an organisational anatomy, which is quite similar to each 
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other. They both have established a purchaser-unit with the following 
main tasks:  
a) With regard to individuals:  
-Specifying the help needed by the elderly applicants. -The handling of 
applicants.  
-The handling of complaints from elderly.  
b) With regard to providers:  
-Specifying quality standards, which the provider shall meet. -Specifying 
the tender conditions.  
-The following up of contracts with providers.  
The two local authorities differ with regard to what field of care for 
elderly people they have reorganised. The local authorities both in 
Denmark and in Norway are legally responsible for their elderly citizens, 
except care in hospitals. This means that the commune's responsibilities 
cover a wide range of services. We can simplify this by making two 
categories of the services; 1) Nursing institutions for elderly people, and 
2) care for the elderly living in a home. While the Danish local authority 
reformed the care for the elderly living in a home, the Norwegian local 
authority reformed the care for the elderly who live in a nursing 
institution. Nevertheless, a common feature is never the less present also 
here. Both local authorities have developed in minute details the contents 
of the service, which is to be offered.  
Take for instance the specification of tasks that are to be observed in 
the private home of an elderly person who shall be given service. The 
Danish local authority is using a scheme that consists of no less than 55 
items describing what is to be done in his home.  
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When I asked the leader of the political committee how the councillors 
were involved with the development of these schemes, she said: 
"Of course it is the administrative staff who prepare a written 
suggestion of how it should look like, but we, the politicians, work it 
through (...). We look through every thing in order to decide which 
level of service we want. That means how often it shall be cleaned and 
how many square meters shall be cleaned (...). We spend a lot of time 
on this. For the time being we are working on a contract that says how 
the food shall be, how it shall be made, if it shall be hot when 
delivered, what it shall contain and from where it shall be brought.(...). 
I think we can say that, by using competitive tendering, we have given 
the politicians more responsibility" (p 73/74).  
Even the head of the opposition group in the committee, a 
representative of the Social Democrats, was in no doubt as to who were 
the real decision makers. She said:  
"We decide. It is a really good co-operation between the administrative 
staff and us politicians. We scrutinise everything and deliver our 
inputs. Take for instance a small thing like firewood. Perhaps it is only 
15-20 persons who need help to collect firewood from outside the 
house. It is of utmost importance of those dependants of this help, even 
though it is a very small issue in the overall service. Such details we 
have to write down in the contract" (p. 74).  
To exemplify the level of details with regard to the provider, I will 
mention that the Norwegian local authority uses 20 full pages to describe 
the tender conditions. Among these are the following specifications of 
various physical handicaps belonging to the clients that the provider has 
to accept:  
"-20% can walk.  
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-80% cannot walk without help/use a wheel chair. -20% can walk to the 
bathroom.  
-80% is in need of assistance to go to the bathroom. -50% must be fed.  
-40% must use a lift.  
-100% need assistance for medication.  
-100% need assistance when going out."  
In the Norwegian local authority I asked the chairman of the political 
committee dealing with these specifications, about the councillors’ role in 
the development of these criteria. As a member of the Progress party, she 
was very enthusiastic about competitive tendering. She said:  
 
"The local authority had never before diagnosed patients with regard 
to such criteria, but it was us, the politicians, who took the final 
decisions as to what the specifications finally  
should be. "  
 
Somewhat unexpectedly, a member of the extreme left party 
(Rød Valgallianse) in the committee, who was firmly hostile to 
competitive tendering, had same positive evaluation of how it worked. 
He said:  
"We (i. e.: the councillors in the committee) have co-operated in the 
development of these (specifications)(...) This is something we agree 
upon, across party lines, is a good thing.(...) It has been very useful for 
us politicians to work with these specifications. "  
The leader of the biggest opposition party in the committee, a 
representative of the Labour party, didn't quite agree with the two former 
members. He said:  
"We should have used a lot more time on this, and drilled more in 
depth (...). Obviously we politicians have a certain influence on this 
matter, but here in our municipality (Moss) we have too many 
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superficial politicians. (...) I miss a discussion about the conditions, is 
it possible at all to implement this within the limits of the budget for 
instance?"  
I choose to use these selections from my interviews as descriptions of 
how the councillors bad been working with the specifications. In spite of 
some differences, the main impression is that the councillors worked 
seriously with the specification of which criteria the administrative or 
professional personnel should use when deciding which persons should 
receive the care they applied for.  
Through these selections from my report I have tried to give the reader 
a representative image of my data. I suppose one can easily imagine that a 
lot of time has been spent on developing these criteria in the two local 
authorities, and every time a new client applies for one of the services in 
question the staff need time to consider the application with regard to 
these criteria. It is not surprisingly, therefore, that none of the local 
authorities, according to my information, has so far been able to downsize 
their staff (Tufte p. 54).  
Some effects of what they did with regard to public ethos  
Let me open out with a few descriptions of effects, as I was informed 
about them through interviews and documents. First I will give some 
illustrations of effects that reflect elements from "the rule of law" and 
"public ethics". I quote from an interview with the leader of the 
committee dealing with dissatisfied clients in the Danish local 
government. He said:  
"The fact that the home service for elderly people have been taken care 
of by a private firm, has improved the possibilities of complaining. 
Nobody needs to fear that a complaint will influence the person who 
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actually does the job in their home, because the service is a commodity 
we purchase" (p. 68).  
This was also in accordance with an evaluation report by an 
independent consultancy firm. It had this to say, among other tings (about 
the Danish local government):  
"The elderly people who receive home service have got an improved 
opportunity to complain, and to complain to a body independent of the 
provider firm" (p. 68).  
This evaluation report has also a positive remark about an effect of the 
establishment of a purchaser-office:  
"The construction of a purchaser-office and the accompanying visit 
calls in the homes of the elderly imply that the service delivered to the 
elderly have be en more identical than what was the case before" (p. 
66).  
 
Also in the Norwegian local government the same picture is clearly 
present. An administrative leader of one of the geographically organized 
services for elderly said:  
"An institution for handling complaints from dissatisfied clients  is 
established which is far better than before. Those who are dissatisfied 
do not any longer have to direct their complaint to the person who 
deliver the service" (p. 43).  
The following excerpt from an interview with a top-level 
administrative leader underlines this:  
"(Earlier) elderly people very reluctantly complained about  the 
service. Elderly people often saw complaining as a direct insult of the 
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person who took care of them. It is a significant improvement of equal 
handling of equal cases and of impartiality" (p. 45).  
Now, let us look at some indications with regard to "political 
democracy". Most of the politicians I interviewed expressed positive 
experiences with regard to their possibilities to influence on vital issues. 
Look for instance at what the representative of the extreme left (Rød 
Valgallianse), perhaps the party most strongly opposed to competitive 
tendering, said about this:  
"We have been working with the tender documents. This is a 
kind of pioneer work. Here we have got very specific instructions (...). 
We have discussed these specifications, and we have been involved in 
the formulation of these. Political also, you see, what instructions we 
should give to the institution that runs the nursing home. I would say 
that this should have been done anyway, even without an 
implementation of competitive tendering, because these instructions 
make it easier to control (...). It has been very useful for us, the 
politicians, to be that involved in this matter, as we have been when 
working with the tender documents" (p. 51).  
It's fair to say that the leader of the major opposition party in the 
commune, who also hold a position in the same committee, didn't quite 
agree with the representative from the far left. He said:  
"Of course we know the content of the tender document, but we 
think it was handled too fast in our commune. The idea of competitive 
tendering was a new idea for us, and therefore we should have used a 
lot more time when we dealt with this.(...) Clearly,  
we politicians have a certain influence on this, but I think we are too 
superficial in our local authority" (p. 53).  
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The answer from the latter respondent indicates that politicians have a 
potential to influence to a greater degree, given that more time had been 
allocated to their handling of the tendering documents.  
In the Danish local authority, both the leader of the committee and the 
leader of the opposition, were more in agreement. The committee-leader 
said:  
"Clearly, the administration gives us significant help in outlining 
the tendering documents, but the  content of the documents  is seriously 
worked through by us, in order to have it as we want it and in line with 
what we want to be responsible for (...) We use a lot of time on this". 
(p. 73).  
The opposition-leader in the committee said:  
"We decide. The co-operation between the administration and us 
is very good. We scrutinise all the time, and deliver our own input" (p. 
74).  
The impression I got from these interviews, which I have attempted to 
give a representative sample of above, is that the politicians still influence 
vital matters with regard to the quantity and quality of the service offered 
in this field of care for elderly people.  
Discussion  
In the section that follows, I shall deal with how public ethos virtues 
like "the rule of law", "public ethics" and "political influence" is handled 
in the market-like models of organisation that I have described above. 
First, I take a look at "the rule of law" and "public ethics".  
A threat to "the rule of law" and "public ethics"?  
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Data indicate that the two local authorities have made strong efforts to 
secure equal treatment of clients.  
My data also picture an organisation that is eager to strengthen the 
clients' possibilities to complain when they are dissatisfied.  
Traditional bureaucracy has vanished, and a new, "modern" way of 
governing by contracts has been the result in the services of elderly 
people in the two local authorities involved. But as I have shown in the 
preceding section, both local authorities have developed a huge amount of 
new rules and criteria in order to handle the allocation of services to the 
elderly. Statements from interviewees’ of different political adherence 
support the impression that this "modern" way of governing implies a 
considerable amount of bureaucracy when it comes to handling with 
issues and people. The bureaucratic aspects of the organisations are at 
least at the same level as they were before the introduction of the 
purchaser- provider-model. Also worth mentioning is that none of the two 
local authorities has reduced the number of employees working with care 
for elderly.  
It is interesting to read that also a study referred to by Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2000) focus on this paradox; they mention a local authority 
home help service for elderly and disabled people that was split between 
the authority purchasing the service and the staff providing it, where they 
discovered that the contract drawn up for the service was 700 pages long 
(p 7).  
Such results (i.e.: more rules) that I found in my material, supports what 
Peters (1993) hypothesized:  
 
The future of the public services may be in using highly 
decentralised and privatised modes of provision. Such a mode of 
production will require, however, much greater attention to means of 
enforcing accountability, controlling competition, assuring co- 
ordination, and ensuring that public service are for the public. These 
are many of the same requirements that provoked the movement away 
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from the dreaded bureaucracies and toward these presumably 
debureaucratised means of serving clients (p. 56).  
While the old-fashioned bureaucracy vanishes and resurrects in a 
modernised form, which probably will be a disappointment to advocates 
of the reform, at the same time a couple of positive developments occur in 
terms of a strengthening of virtues connected to the public ethos.  
First of all because the purchaser-provider model establishes a distance 
between those who offer the service (i.e.: nursing, washing, cleaning) and 
those empowered. This distance is not that clear in the traditional model. 
Because complaints now are directed to a body outside the authority of 
those who deliver the service, it feels easier for the elderly to complain.  
Further, through new and very detailed specifications of the volume 
and quality of the service that is to be delivered, one has to admit that the 
position of those who complain have been strengthened. An additional 
point is that, when competitive tendering is being used, the agent will 
have an incentive to accept a complaint because the firm wants to remain 
in business.  
This is, by the way, also an argument, which are supported by 
Rothstein (1994) in a theoretical discussion about what he calls 
"autonomous citizens". As Rothstein points out, a private provider of 
public services is more eager, than it would have been as a public 
enterprise, to listen to complaints, because of fear of losing the contract 
by the next invitation to tender (p. 234).  
Another positive implication is that the possibility of equal treatment 
of all has been strengthened. This is because the service-contracts, which 
are devices connected to the new model, give very specified details of 
what services are to be offered to each elderly person according to his 
condition of health. Sometimes, when private firms are established in 
markets that earlier were public monopolies, it happens that unwanted 
distributive effects are the result (Ringstad: 380). This is because down 
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payments are introduced, which puts equal treatment of people in 
jeopardy. No such thing occurred in the two cases studied.  
Equal treatment of individuals and the right to appeal against service 
and decisions, as stated earlier, are among the fundamental conditions to 
public ethos. It is surprising, therefore, that the reforms do not seem to 
have compelled the two local authorities to adopt a culture that is alien to 
their ideological and legal character, as some have suggested that such 
reforms would do (Batley, 1991: 217). What we witness seems to me to 
be a revitalisation of traditional bureaucratic virtues connected to the rule 
of law and equal treatment of people. These are virtues closely connected 
to the public ethos.  
Political influence  
Now considering political influence as another vital aspect of public 
ethos, my interpretation of the data indicates that neither has this value 
been seriously neglected. My point of departure for reaching this 
conclusion, I must stress, lies in a somewhat different role for the 
politicians than a traditional one. A traditional role implies that politicians 
are active representatives of the citizens and a political party. As such 
they are focused on issues, which now and then can be of rather small 
importance for the overall citizenry, though of significant importance for 
groups or an individual. The term "ombud" is often used to describe this 
role for the politician (Opedal, Stigen, Laudal, 2002:41). The role that I 
discuss differs also somewhat from the last two decades' ideal for local 
politicians, where the strategist aspect of the role for the politician has 
been strongly recommended. This role implies that politicians act as goal-
formulating governors, deciding what principles shall act as guide-lines 
for service-delivery. An important implication of this role is that 
politicians shall not engage in day-to-day affairs. Such tasks are only for 
professional people in the administration. My role model for politicians 
can be put in- between the two models just mentioned. In lack of 
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established labels I call this role "contract manager". This role implies 
that politicians have a more distant role in the implementation process 
and management of services, whilst they are somewhat closer to the 
strategist ideal. My view is that politicians' potentials to govern have been 
strengthened. This is contrary to what Christensen and Lægreid, (op. cit.)  
claim. This strengthening is possible through three different aspects of 
their role:  
-through the role they play in developing contracts vis à  vis the 
competing firms,  
-through the role they play in developing contracts about the service 
between the local government and the individual, elderly people, and  
-through the role they play in evaluating the effects of the competitive 
tendering.  
My interpretation based on my own, admittedly limited empirical data, 
challenges in one respect the overwhelmingly negative impression one 
gets from reading studies about which effects NPM-inspired reforms have 
on democratic virtues. I state that some important functions are not so 
quite in the hands of the professional administration as others say 
(Montin, 1996).  
However, it remains to be learned what will be the implications on 
public ethos in a longer perspective.  
  
A reflection of epistemology  
I shall raise two questions of epistemology. One question is if it is right 
to conclude that the revitalisation of traditional bureaucratic virtues, 
which my data indicate, is an implication of the NPM-like models alone. 
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Some may point to other variables of importance. In Norway, for 
instance, the government in 1997 decided that all local authorities should 
implement systems of quality control in the field of health-service. And 
what Denmark concerns, it is important to have in mind that the 
government has decided that all local authorities should establish a 
council to deal with appeals against decisions in individual cases 
regarding care for the elderly in their homes. It can be argued, therefore, 
that such government-initiated rules also have contributed to the 
revitalisation of the traditional bureaucratic virtues. In a broader 
perspective, however, one can put such government-initiated rules also 
under the concept New Public Management. If one agrees in this, one can 
say that this strengthens my interpretation that NPM-like models not 
necessarily damage traditional bureaucratic virtues. On the contrary, they 
can be revitalised through such models, in some occasions.  
Another question of epistemology concerns why some of my data run 
contradictory to the often negative pictures one comes across when 
reading comments from political scientists about NPM-reforms. One can 
ask why my picture is somewhat different. It might have to do with the 
level of analysis. My data are gathered from the lowest level of the 
political system, i.e.: local governments. These are units at a micro-level 
of the political system. Most empirical studies about NPM-reforms that 
are done within the framework of the focus of this article (as far as I 
know) are focused on the macro-level. May be this is why positive aspect 
like the ones I have discussed, do not become so easily manifest? Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2000) admirably admit that this is a reasonably well 
founded question when they give the following concluding remark in 
their book: "To end this book on an appropriate note on self-criticism, 
one of the major limitations of our approach - and the approaches of 
many others who have concentrated on big reforms and big ideas - is that 
we capture very little of this micro- improvement" (p. 191).  
A challenge to further research on the subject, therefore, might be to 
carry through more studies at this level. One way to start would be to 
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gather empirical data that more broadly, than what has been done in my 
study, could shed light on the question of how councillors behave under 
circumstances like those described here. To my knowledge what is 
written about this so far in the Nordic countries is mostly about how 
councillors evaluate and/or what they think about their new role. There is 
a lack of empirical studies that highlight, on other indications than 
interview data, how councillors act in the flesh. In order to do this one has 
to develop research designs that focus less on incumbents' own evaluation 
of their behaviour and more on different indicators of influence. This 
means, among other things that the concept political influence has to be 
dealt with in new ways. To get this kind of data, I think one has to 
operationalize the behaviour of politicians in new ways. To my mind, the 
concepts "political influence" and “governability” will be of crucial 
importance in an effort to do so.  
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Appendix  
Data and methodology  
Data consist of two parts: a) Documents dealing with the preparations for- 
and implementation of - a purchaser- provider-model in combination with 
competitive tendering in a Danish commune, Græsted-Gilleleje, and a 
Norwegian commune, Moss.  
b) 11 interviews with leading political and administrative personnel in the 
two local authorities.  
The interviews, which lasted between one and two hours, were 
accomplished with the help of a semi-structured guide. It had two aims. 
The first aim was to fill out the picture of the reforms, as it had developed 
through my reading of documents. The second aim was to get an 
impression of how leading persons, involved in the reform, looked upon 
the reform. A problem with this approach is of course that it is biased, 
because only elitist views on the reform have been caught. However, I 
consider this a minor problem because the interviewees, in spite of quite 
different views on the reform, have told almost the same story  (it is one 
exception to this). The exceptional case is discussed under the heading 
“Some effects of what they did with regard to public ethos” in the paper.  
From a quantitative point of view, the data are modest. Nevertheless 
the data give a lot of information about the reforms in question in the two 
local authorities, and in my opinion enough to represent a modest test of 
the papers' initial question, where I asked if certain negative pictures of 
NPM are valid under all circumstances.  
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